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A fish stinks from the head
1:  
Ethnic diversity, segregation, and  









Demographic analysis clarifies political issues in the collapse of Yugoslavia. In most 
regions, 1961-1991, ethnic diversity (estimated by informational entropy) increased and 
segregation (estimated by Theil’s H) decreased. In a few regions there was a reversal in 
1991 as migration flows or presentations of self perhaps changed in anticipation of war. 
The analysis strengthens refutations of the view that long standing ethnic hatreds were 
the root cause of the Yugoslav collapse and supports analyses that attribute collapse to 
general economic crisis, economic competition between regions, and failures at the 
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1. Introduction  
We seek here to throw some demographic light on the collapse of Yugoslavia in the 
1990s. We include data as late in time before the collapse as possible and thus 
incorporate information from the census of 1991, although its form and scope are less 
than ideal.
2 We extend the analysis as early as we can where the data are reasonably 
consistent in ethnic classification and territorial organization, namely to the census of 
1961. We use data at the lowest level of aggregation in the census, namely the village or 
urban neighborhood, because we feel that ethnic diversity is most important socially 
and psychologically to individuals at that level.
3 However, we extend the analysis 
upward to higher levels as well. The paper makes use of work in sociology, history, 
ethnography, and political science as background to the demographic analysis. 
What can demographic analysis tell us that other studies have not? This paper will 
show that, with some illuminating exceptions, ethnic diversity was increasing, and 
ethnic segregation decreasing at all census administrative levels 1961-91, but that there 
were even in these trends some prophetic local reversals between 1981 and 1991. These 
observations raise a series of interpretive questions that go beyond demographic 
analysis. Nevertheless, the demographic analysis is embedded in and motivated by 
them, so that they must be addressed. At the same time it is not our intention nor within 
our competence to offer a complete analysis from the viewpoints of sociology or 
political science. There already exist other analyses from those and other perspectives.
4 
Our intent is to supplement them with a statistical analysis of ethnic distributions. 
 
•  Can the ethnic violence and collapse of Yugoslavia be attributed simply to 
long-standing and pervasive ethnic hatreds? This notion is the usual 
journalistic explanation. 
•  Can the violence be attributed to the processes of ethnic diversification and 
desegregation themselves? Could the inhabitants of Yugoslavia simply not 
endure the increasingly cosmopolitan character of their environment? 
•  Can the violence and separatism instead be attributed to a loss of control by the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia, weakened by the economic crises of the 
1980s and the rise of competition and dissatisfaction between constituent 
republics defined by dominant ethnicities? Did regional politicians seize on 
ethnicity as a device in quest of power? 
 
In short, did Yugoslavia split from the bottom up or from the top down? 
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2. Historical background  
Yugoslavia was cobbled together at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 as part of an 
attempt to unite similar ethnic groups as a cordon sanitaire around a defeated German-
Austrian alliance.
5 Like many regions of southeastern Europe, it held a congeries of 
ethnic groups, the jetsam of tribal and imperial waves that had swept across the Balkans 
for millennia. In the several centuries before World War I three major empires had held 
sway: the Venetian along the Adriatic, the Austro-Hungarian in the northwest, and the 
Ottoman in the southeast. Their boundaries did not coincide with divisions between 
ethnic groups. Many of these groups, especially pastoral ones, had been traditionally 
mobile. Many had scattered from southeast to northwest in flight from the Ottoman 
advance, and Serbs in particular fled or were invited into Habsburg territory to serve as 
frontier guards. Local relationships between these groups were often economically 
symbiotic, not always cordial, but not necessarily hostile unless poisoned by the 
influence of imperial masters. Figure 1 shows the geographical distribution of the 
principal ethnic groups in majority across the territory in 1991.
6 The map is a rough 
guide. It does not tell us much about areas in which no group had a majority but may 
have had a plurality, especially in Bosnia.
7 It does not tell us how diverse a region was 
ethnically, no matter which group was in majority. We seek here to draw a more 
detailed picture statistically if not cartographically. 
This ethnic diversity is illustrated in some ways by the multiplicity of distinct 
languages natively spoken in the region, that is by groups with long historical depth.
8 
One authoritative count lists 22.
9 Of the non-Slavic languages, only Albanian and 
Hungarian had large numbers of native speakers within Yugoslavia. Of the Slavic 
languages, Bulgarian and Slovak had few, leaving the major languages of the former 
Yugoslavia, from northwest to southeast: Slovenian, Croatian, Serbian, Macedonian. 
The disappearance of “Serbo-Croatian” and its replacement by Serbian, Croatian, and 
now Bosnian confirms the classic quip of linguists, “A language is a dialect with an 
army.” 
Language, or at least speech, however, are not perfect predictors of ethnicity in the 
political sense. It is often difficult to distinguish the ethnicity of Bosniaks (Muslim 
Slavs in Bosnia) from that of Bosnian Serbs or Croats residing in the same local area by 
listening to their speech. Indeed, it is often only their names that give a clue, showing 
those with names of Arabic-Turkish derivation to be Muslims, or those named after 
saints in the Orthodox or Roman churches to be, respectively, Serbs or Croats. Some 
other baptismal names and patronymics are also typically Serbian or Croatian. Persons 
might also be distinguished by vocabulary differences, with Muslims using more words 
of Turkish/Arabic origin, or phrases from the Koran, with Catholic Croats and 
Orthodox Serbs relying on their own sacred texts. Otherwise, dialect differences Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
 
throughout the former Yugoslavia are geographically rather than politically defined, 
even though the several standard languages are politically defined. Ethnicity can also be 
signaled by items of traditional costume.
10,11 
 
Figure 1:  Majority ethnic distributions in Yugoslavia at the municipal level  




Source: Created at the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, 1992. Image currently maintained through the University of Texas Libraries, 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/europe/yugoslav.jpg. See http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Yugoslavia_ethnic_map.jpg 
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3. The Yugoslav Censuses  
Our analysis is based on the published tabulations contained on the CD issued by the 
Federal Statistical Office of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia 1998). This source is unusual in 
that it is not only machine-readable but also provides preliminary tabulations on several 
demographic variables for the census of 1991 and also a series of tables of ethnic 
distributions in prior censuses back to 1921. For the later censuses, the tables provide 
data at the lowest level of aggregation (see below). While these data are essential for an 
historical overview of ethnic distributions, they have limitations that must be kept in 
mind. These stem from the nature of the census process itself. 
 
1.  The first step in the process is the interaction between the census taker and the 
respondent. Not until 1971 were the data on the question of ethnicity based entirely 
on the voluntary declaration of the respondent (including the declaration of the 
ethnicity of children under age 15 by their parents). Before that date, the census-
taker played some role in offering examples, or in the earlier post-war censuses 
(1948, 1953), simply assigning ethnic membership.
12 
 
2.  The second step is the reduction of a large number of ethnic groups to a smaller 
number of categories, including a residual “Other”. It is important to note that 
“Other” is not the only residual category. A second residual category is “Yugoslav 
– unallocated”, often tabulated simply as “Yugoslav”, that is, persons of Yugoslav 
citizenship or heritage (poreklo) who did not declare or were not assigned to a 
specific ethnic group. The degree of residuality of “Yugoslav”, however, differs in 
different censuses. In 1953 Yugoslav ethnic Muslims (thus not Muslim ethnic 
Turks, or Albanians, etc.), whether or not they practiced Islam, were allocated to 
the “Yugoslav” category.  
 
 
3.  The third step is the tabulation of the data into an even smaller number of 
categories for purposes of publication. As with most census data in all countries, 
the degree of specificity is greatest at the highest levels of aggregation and vice-
versa. For example, the tables of ethnic membership for the historical censuses of 
Yugoslavia in the data source for this analysis provide much more detailed 
specifications of ethnic affiliation at the municipality level than they do for the 
lower, settlement, level. 
 
4.  A fourth limitation of the data is the loss of uniform formats across the different 
regions of Yugoslavia in the published data for the 1991 census. This regionalism Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
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even affected the conduct of that census; some regions did not participate in the 
pre-test, some omitted questions, some apparently did not report the results at the 
lowest level of aggregation to the Federal Statistical Office (Mrdjen 2002). Indeed, 
insurgency had already begun in Serbian majority regions of Croatia when the 
census was taken on March 31, 1991, as a result of Croatia’s declaration of 
independence and legislative changes that would have altered the historical status 




3.1 Ethnicity in the Yugoslav Censuses  
Ethnicity or its plausible indicators have been tabulated in the censuses of Yugoslavia 
since the first national count in 1921. In 1921 and 1931 mother tongue and religious 
affiliation were tabulated but unfortunately not cross-tabulated. Thus, the data from 
those years cannot be easily transformed into the ethnic categories used later because 
the fit between language, religion, and ethnicity is not clear cut. For example, Serbs and 
Croats were both listed as speakers of “Serbo-Croatian” and cannot be distinguished on 
linguistic grounds. All Orthodox in a region are not necessarily Serbs, nor are all 
Catholics necessarily Croats. Neither are all Muslims Muslim Slavs.
14 Although it 
would have been interesting to examine data on ethnicity beginning with the first 
postwar census (1948), the published data do not permit it. It is difficult to create a 
consistent data set from 1948 onward because the system of ethnic classification in the 
tabulations did not stabilize until the census of 1961. Indeed, it is consistent only 1961-
1981 across all segments of the territory. In 1991 it continues in almost consistent form 
for Serbia and Montenegro (who jointly formed the rump Yugoslavia after the 
secessions), but the categorization employed in the published tables at the lowest level 
of aggregation is drastically simplified in Bosnia and Croatia. There are no useful data 
for Kosovo and two municipalities of Central Serbia in 1991, and there are no data in 




3.2 Territorial organization in the Yugoslav Censuses  
From 1961 onward the lowest level of aggregation in the census tables was the naselje 
(pl.  naselja).
16,17 The next higher level was the opština (pl. opštine, approx. 
“municipality”). Opštine were typically named after the naselje that was their seat and 
also appear in the tabulations as naselja; thus they are listed twice, once as a naselje and 
once as the summary of their constituent naselja, but they are easily distinguished in the 
published tables. Opštine were not just census units but important administrative units. Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
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The next higher level was the republic, although Serbia itself was divided at an 
intermediate level into Central Serbia and two other regions with a degree of autonomy 
that had varied over time – the Voyvodina in the north and Kosovo in the south. In this 
analysis we treat all of these entities above the opština as equivalent in level, i.e., the 
republics other than Serbia and the three sections of Serbia as described, and call them 
all regions.  
Before 1961 data were not published at the naselje level, and the lowest level 
fluctuated in scope and name but was higher than the naselje. We do not use censuses 
before 1961 not only because they do not have data at the naselje level but also, as 
noted, because their classifications of ethnicity are not consistent with those 1961-1991. 
The geographical boundaries of census units above the naselje and below the region are 
also rather volatile over time, so that these units form a time series with changing 
content. Naselja are more consistent, but they, too, pose problems. Some naselja 
disappear from the census; these seem often to be small villages that were abandoned, 
but they may also be urban neighborhoods that were renamed. Some naselja appear in 
the middle of the census series; these appear to be genuinely new settlements, although 
they, too, may be old naselja renamed. While the renaming of naselja is not as frequent 
as the politically driven ubiquitous renaming of streets, it does occur.
18 More 
problematic than renaming is the varying spelling in the different censuses of the names 
of naselja that seem almost surely to be the same places.
 19  
It is important to note, however, that the analysis presented here is not one of a 
time series of the naselja themselves but rather a time series of cross-sections of naselja. 
Each observation that we examine is a naselje at a point in time, located in its opština 
and its region at that point in time, and we do not rely, in our main analysis, on whether 
these points, even if identically named, are the same across the four censuses. Similarly, 
analysis of opštine over time is one of a time series of cross-sections. These caveats do 





4. Ethnic classification in this analysis
21 
The underlying data on ethnicity consist of the census taker’s judgment  of a 
respondent’s ethnicity or of a respondent’s declaration of ethnic affiliation (narodna 
pripadnost) to the census taker. There was an evolution of these methods over time, 
described below, but they appear to have been relatively consistent in 1971-1991. By 
1971 respondents could declare an ethnicity as such (e.g., “I am a Serb”), or they could 
claim an ethnicity on grounds of residence in a republic (e.g., “I am Serbian because I 
live in Serbia”), or they could decline to state an ethnicity. In the latter case, they would Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
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presumably be classified as “Yugoslav – unallocated” if they were Yugoslav citizens or 
of Yugoslav heritage, or as “Other” if they were not. 
Yugoslav political philosophy was very sensitive to issues of ethnicity, especially 
to the history of conflict between the major ethnic groups. Under the Yugoslav 
constitution(s) after 1945 there were five “constitutive ethnicities”, called narodi
22, 
each associated with one of the republics, which was its historical homeland,  if not the 
residence, of all its members: Croatian, Macedonian, Montenegrin, Serbian, and 
Slovenian. Serbs, for example, also formed large minorities in Croatia and Bosnia and 
decreasingly so over time in Kosovo. Serbs resident in Croatia were also a constitutive 
ethnicity in Croatia, since they had formed a large portion of the population of Croatia 
since the 16
th century. There were, in addition, a number of other recognized ethnic 
groups, called narodnosti
23,
 living in Yugoslavia but having a recognized homeland 
outside Yugoslavia (or no recognized or uncontested homeland, such as Roma, Cincari, 
Bunjevci, Vlachs, and others) and thus not having a republic that was ethnically, 
historically, and constitutionally their own. The largest of these groups were the 
Albanians, mostly concentrated in Kosovo, and Hungarians, mostly concentrated in 
Voyvodina. Although a republic, Bosnia did not have a constitutive ethnicity.
24 The 
central problems of Yugoslav ethnic politics are that some narodi had a large presence 
in a region not their own, and some very numerous narodnosti had no constitutional 
home.
25  
Two other “ethnicities” are of particular interest, and they are interrelated. One is 
that of “unallocated Muslims” (neopredeljeni Muslimani). These are persons who 
identify themselves as Muslim in the ethnic sense, but who are not necessarily 
observant Muslims.
26 These would include Muslims of Yugoslav origin
27, such as those 
in Bosnia or the Sandžak (the territory between Kosovo, Montenegro, and 
Hercegovina). In theory, persons of Muslim faith who were not of Yugoslav origin 
could not claim to be Muslims in the ethnic sense. Persons of Muslim faith who had 
declared another ethnicity, such as Albanian, would not be included in this “unallocated 
Muslim” category. The other category of interest is “Yugoslav”, or more precisely 
“unallocated Yugoslav.” It can be construed as a residual category of Yugoslav citizens 
who did not declare any ethnic tie, or who declared an ethnicity that was not separately 
tabulated, or of those who chose “Yugoslav” because it superceded previous ethnic 
divisions. 
There are some subtle shifts in the counting of (ethnic) Muslims. Muslims of 
Yugoslav heritage were politically recognized as a separate nationality in first postwar 
census (1948) but not tallied as such. In that census the census taker was given a list of 
example categories, and instructed to tally Muslims who had declared no other ethnicity 
(e.g., Albanian), as Serb-Muslims, Croat-Muslims, or “unallocated Muslims”. In 1953 
the census-taker was again given a list of example categories and directed to write down Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
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the ethnicity of the respondent, but there was no “unallocated Muslim” category 
published in the tables. The census taker was also instructed to write “Yugoslav-
unallocated” for respondents “of Yugoslav origin … who had not been ethnically more 
closely allocated.” In 1961 the designation, “Muslim”, was defined as “in the ethnic 
sense” and applied only to persons of Yugoslav origin, i.e., not to Albanians, Turks, etc. 
and further not to ethnic Serbs, Croats, and others who were of Islamic faith. These 
allocations, according to the instructions, were apparently determined by the census 
taker, presumably after querying the respondent.  
In 1971, there was a marked change in the instructions, namely that the respondent 
was to be recorded according to his or her own declaration, with the ethnicity of 
children under age 15 declared by their parents. The instructions explicitly state that 
respondents who do not wish to declare their ethnicity need not do so. Throughout the 
series of censuses, various terms, such as “ethnic membership”, “ethnic minority”, 
“nationality”, etc., were used interchangeably and without definition. The term, 
“minority”, was eventually dropped because it might be thought derogatory. 
The second category of special interest is “Yugoslav”. In the earlier censuses 
before 1961 it appears to have been a residual category for persons of Yugoslav origin 
or citizenship for whom the census taker could not determine an ethnic category, or 
those respondents who did not respond with an ethnic category. The number of persons 
in Yugoslavia listing Yugoslav as their ethnicity (or having it determined for them) is 
never large, except in Bosnia, although its proportional fluctuations may be. There may 
be a categorical equivalent of “Muslim” and “Yugoslav” in some censuses (see below). 
Otherwise, “Yugoslav” appears to have been a response of members of the League of 
Communists, of military officers, or of dedicated supporters of the national unity of 
Yugoslavia even if they were not members of the League, or, as suggested above, 
especially of Muslims or others who did not wish to identify themselves in traditional 
ethnic terms.
28 It may also have provided an opportunity for the children of ethnically 
mixed marriages or spouses in such marriages to choose a neutral ethnic alternative.
29 
This declaration (“Yugoslav”) is of special interest because it is unambiguously a 
political statement. However, it is important to note that all declarations of ethnicity in 
Yugoslavia (and perhaps universally) are in some sense political statements.
30 (See also 
Urdal 2001.) 
Using the published tables on which our analysis is based, we observe that in 1961 
eighty-seven percent or 842,000 of the 973,000 tabulated (ethnic) Muslims in 
Yugoslavia resided in Bosnia. Eighty-seven percent or 276,000 of the 317,000 tabulated 
“unallocated Yugoslavs” in Yugoslavia were also resident in Bosnia. If the persons 
tabulated as “Yugoslav” had all really been Muslims, there would have been 1.1 million 
of the latter. In the next census (1971) 86 percent or 1.5 million of the 1.7 million 
Muslims in Yugoslavia resided in Bosnia, but only 16 percent or 44,000 of the 273,000 Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
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“unallocated Yugoslavs” did. Muslims in Bosnia increased by 640,000 or 76 percent; 
“Yugoslavs” decreased by 232,000 or 84 percent. Even if all of the increase in Muslims 
was simply an “ethnic migration” of “Yugoslavs” into “Muslims”, there are still about 
400,000 people unaccounted for. Assuming (and not unreasonably) that crude death 
rates were about the same for Muslims and non-Muslims, and also that Muslim crude 
fertility rates were as much as double those of non-Muslims (also not unreasonable), the 
numbers still do not balance. There may have been other trading partners in this 
network. Serbs and Croats, the other two major ethnic groups in Bosnia, show almost 
no change in number between 1961 and 1971. It is possible that they actually 
experienced some population growth but that some proportion of their population, 
having reported as non-Muslim in 1961, elected to report as Muslim in 1971. It is also 
possible that some non-Yugoslav Muslims (ethnic Albanians, ethnic Turks, etc.) may 
have claimed Yugoslav Muslim ethnicity.
31 
The usual “balance equation” for demographic analysis contains three terms: 
births, deaths, and net migration. The balance equation for ethnic groups in Yugoslavia 
(and doubtless elsewhere) contains four: births, deaths, net geographical migration, and 
net ethnic redefinition. Even if good data were available for births and deaths by 
ethnicity by fairly small regions, we would still need accurate data on geographical 
migration to net out the “migration” by ethnic redefinition. We do not have the 
necessary data to solve this puzzle. 
We should also note that ethnic redefinition is not a new phenomenon, historically, 
either for individuals or for populations. For example, some tribes of old Montenegro, 
such as the Klimenti, are reputed to be of “Albanian” (Gheg) origin. Thus at some 
historical point, perhaps about the same time as the introduction of Orthodox 
Christianity or later during the hegemony of the Serbian Empire, they and some other 
Ghegs adopted Orthodox Christianity and the Klimenti were Slavicized. One may 
speculate that they had already been bilingual.
32 Other, small but distinct ethnic groups 
such as the Bunjevci, Šokci, Torlakians, Vlachs, and others, fragments of the migrations 
triggered by the Ottoman advance and the Habsburg counteradvance, or simply those of 
ancient transhumance, often struggle politically and culturally to maintain their identity.  
Our point here is that ethnicity is not absolute. It is subject to more mutability than 
biological race and its DNA. Ethnicity can change by acculturation, by individual 
inclination, and transactionally and inconsistently by individuals. Just as individuals 
may present themselves in alternative ways (for example, classically, by linguistic 
code-switching), groups can negotiate their social boundaries, for example by religious 
conversion. It is not identity but a statement about membership. (See for example the 
classic presentation of this issue by Barth (1969) and recent work on bilingualism in 
Wei (2000).) However, with no apology for this recitation of issues from the softer 
social sciences like sociolinguistics or transactional analysis, we press ahead, Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
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cautiously, to see what demography can contribute. In sum, we may say that the 
demographic picture obtainable from these censuses is like that from many other 
excellent censuses. It shows a population responding to rates of birth and death, people 
moving across landscapes, and people oozing in and out of social categories. We accept 
those ambiguities, for what interests us is how people viewed themselves and how they 
might think their neighbors viewed them. 
Ambiguity does not end with this recitation. Although shifts in the count of 
persons by ethnicity can occur by self-definition, changes in self-definition can reflect 
either confidence or fear, acceptance of diversity, or the rise of defensive nationalism. 
Further, the census counts of persons by ethnicity may suffer from nonrandom error. 
(We address random error in a later section.) Such errors are commonplace in the 
censuses of other countries, where they have been detected by post-enumeration 
surveys. Different segments of the population are counted with differing degrees of 
accuracy; minorities and the poor are often undercounted, the rich may be counted more 
than once if the census is residence-based. We are not aware of accessible post-
enumeration survey data that would allow us to take undercounts and overcounts into 
consideration for the censuses that we analyze here.
33 In fact, such errors make our 
interpretations conservative. Correction of undercounts of minority populations would 
increase our measure of diversity.
34 Note also that the enumerations of persons by 
ethnicity include the population of Yugoslav citizens living abroad. The ethnic 
distribution of Yugoslavs living abroad differs by region, by ethnicity, and by point in 
time. If the enumeration of such persons is subject to nonrandom error, the reported 
ethnic proportions will be biased in some unknown direction and degree. The issue is 
complicated not only by errors in the reporting of departures and returns, but also by the 
reporting of births and deaths in the population living abroad. We have no way to 
estimate these errors. If a population living abroad is undercounted and also the 
majority population in its home area, correction of the error will decrease our measure 
of diversity; if that undercounted population is not the majority population in its home 
area, correction of the error will increase our measure of diversity. 
The censuses are all we have. We must interpret them with caution. In the end, we 
can only fall back on philosophical statements, for example, that “statistics is the blind 
man’s cane”, or quote 1 Corinthians 13 to remark that “for now we see through a glass, 
darkly”. 
Table 1 shows the ethnic classifications published for the censuses of Yugoslavia 
1961-81 at the naselje level and in those of the reporting successor states in 1991.
35 We 
discuss how to accommodate the diversity of these classifications in a later section. 
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Table 1:  Ethnic categorization at the naselje level 1961-1991  
  (in English alphabetical order) 
 
  1961 1971 1981  1991SMV  1991BOS  1991CRO 
1  Albanian Albanian Albanian Albanian     
2  Croat Croat Croat Croat  Croat  Croat 
3  Hungarian Hungarian Hungarian Hungarian     
4 Macedonian  Macedonian  Macedonian       
5  Montenegrin Montenegrin Montenegrin Montenegrin     
6  Muslim Muslim Muslim Muslim  Muslim  Muslim 
7 (Other)  (Other)  (Other)  Other  Other  Other 
8  Roma Roma Roma Roma     
9       Romanian     
10 Serb Serb Serb Serb  Serb  Serb 
11       Slovak     
12 Slovene  Slovene  Slovene       
13  Yugoslav Yugoslav Yugoslav Yugoslav  Yugoslav  Yugoslav 
 
Note: SMV = Central Serbia, Montenegro, Voyvodina 
“(Other)” is implicit, calculated by subtraction of all other categories from the total population. “Other” is explicitly given in the 
census. The order of the categories in this table is not the same as their order in the published data or in Mrdjen’s summary 
(2002) but is uniformly alphabetical (in English); the ordering in the source tables, where alphabetic, is sometimes in the 
Cyrillic rather than the Latin alphabet. The historical ordering of ethnic categories in the published tables is both complex and 
political. In 1948-1961 the tables list “Narodnost” (“Nationality”). In 1971 they list “Narodnost ili Etnička Pripadnost” (“Nationality 
or Ethnic Membership”). In 1981 they list “Narod, Narodnost ili Etnička Pripadnost” (“Nation, Nationality or Ethnic 
Membership)” (Mrdjen 2002). In 1948 all groups were listed in order of numerical preponderance. Subsequently, groups of 
Yugoslav origin were in a first sublist, all others in a second sublist. The Yugoslav groups in 1953 and 1961 were ordered by 
numerical preponderance except that “unallocated Yugoslavs” were placed last in the sublist; all non-Yugoslav groups were 
unordered in the second sublist. In 1971 there were three sublists. The first was of narodi (the constitutive nations). The 
second was of narodnosti (the non-constitutive nationalities), and the third was of all other reported groups. In all censuses 
except 1953, Muslims (in the ethnic sense) are listed specifically; in 1953 they were part of the “(unallocated) Yugoslav” 
category. In 1948 Jews are not listed separately. In 1953 they are listed as Židovi. Subsequently they are listed as Jevreji 
(“Hebrews”) in the “foreign” sublist, and in 1971 in the third or “most foreign” sublist, despite the fact that Romaniote Jews had 
been resident in the Yugoslav lands probably at least since the destruction of the Second Temple, and other Jews certainly 
since the expulsion of the Sephardim from Spain in the 15
th Century. Like Mrdjen, we see a lot of political nuance in these 
details, in a struggle to accommodate diversity and unity at the same time. 
 
 
It is also important to note that in the end the published data are tabulated in a 
fixed form reflecting the political importance of the major ethnic groups. This political 
sensitivity is clearly apparent in Table 1, where the available tables in 1991 at the 
naselje level for Croatia and Bosnia are limited to the locally most important groups, 
and the collective of Central Serbia, Voyvodina, and Montenegro dropped Macedonian 
and Slovenian and added Slovak and Romanian. There are few Macedonians or Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
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Slovenians in the three-member collective but substantial numbers of Slovaks and 
Romanians in the Voyvodina. Montenegro conformed in this, as a member of the rump 
Yugoslavia at the time of census publication. Our task would have been simpler and the 
results more useful if the available machine-readable data were consistently structured 
in 1991, as they were in the previous three censuses. It is important to stress again that 
our analysis is based on the published tabulations at the naselje level (Yugoslavia 
1998). More detailed specification of ethnic distributions is available in that source for 
1991, but only at the opština level and above, and not for all regions. The tables at the 
opština level for Bosnia in 1991 show only five categories, Croatia 29, Montenegro 
nine, Macedonia six, Slovenia 29, and all three regions of Serbia 22. A separate analysis 
of diversity and segregation at the opština level and above would still be limited by the 
five-category structure reported for Bosnia.  
 
 
5. Methods  
Following the lead of Fischer et al. (2004) and predecessors (e.g., Theil 1967) we 
examine two measures, one of diversity, the other of segregation.
36 
 
5.1 Diversity  
The diversity measure, applied to all levels of census aggregation from the naselje to 
the region, is one of informational entropy, first proposed by Shannon in 1949 
(Shannon and Weaver 1949). In this application it expresses the uncertainty (HS) about 
the ethnic identity of a person chosen at random. Imagine, for example, an individual, 
blindfolded, in a room full of other persons. Suppose that one of these other persons is 
brought before the blindfolded one, and the latter is asked to guess the ethnicity of the 
former. The blindfolded person only knows the number of ethnic groups in the room 
and their proportional representation. If the blindfolded person knows there is only one 
ethnic group in the room, her uncertainty about the identity of the person before her is 
zero. The larger is the number of ethnic groups in the room, the greater is her 
uncertainty about the identity of the person before her. Further, the more equal is the 
proportional representation of the ethnic groups, the greater is her uncertainty. Thus for 
example, if there are two ethnic groups, and their proportional representation is 99:1, 
her uncertainty is lower than if their proportional representation were 50:50. If there are 
three groups, and they are distributed 1/3:1/3:1/3, her uncertainty is higher yet, and so 
on. The following formula expresses these relationships: 










=−∑  (1) 
 
where Hs is Shannon’s entropy, pi is the proportion of the population in category i and 
ln is the natural logarithm.
37 We use Hs to distinguish Shannon’s entropy from the Theil 
measure described below. 
Where p=0, the value of p*ln(p) is assumed to be zero. Thus an empty category 
contributes nothing to the sum. If one category contains all of the observations so that 
all other categories are empty, the value of Hs is 0, and there is no uncertainty about the 
identity of an observation. While Hs always has a lower bound of zero, its upper bound 
is a function of the number of non-empty categories. Hs is maximized for any number 
of categories when the distribution across them is equal. The circular points (o) in 
Figure 2 show how Hs increases with the number of categories under conditions of 
perfect equality between the categories. The dashed points (-) show a very simple 
scenario of variable inequality for a two-category system. In this, the first category has, 
successively, shares of 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, and the second category has the residual, 
thus 0.9, 0.8, 0.7, 0.6, 0.5. Entropy increases with equality of sharing and is thus 
maximal with perfect equality. The topmost dashed point has the same value as the 
circular point for a two-category system with equal shares. The plus marks (+) show the 
result of a distribution in which only one of the census ethnic categories has any 
members in a given community, regardless of the number of categories in the census; 
entropy, i.e. diversity, in such circumstances is zero, since ln(0) is by definition zero. 
Thus, although entropy has a lower bound of zero, it has no fixed upper bound, since it 
depends on the number of groups as well as on their proportional distribution. 
 
 
5.2 Segregation  
The segregation measure (HT,  Theil 1967) is applied to any superordinate level of 
census aggregation, that is, from the opština to the region. It expresses the degree to 
which units of the immediately subordinate level differ in their entropy (Hs) one from 
another, analogous to a measure of the variance between subsamples. The lower and 
upper bounds of HT are [0,1]. (Our notation attempts to keep the relationship between 
formulae (1) and (2) transparent.) Note especially that HT cannot be calculated for the 
lowest level of aggregation; thus here it cannot be calculated for naselja. That restriction 
is unfortunate, because some naselja in some censuses are relatively large and are 
almost surely ethnically diverse, divided into traditional subunits, such as the mahala 
(ward) or komšiluk (neighborhood), and with some degree of segregation. 
Segregation is defined as follows: 


















)  (2)   
 
where m is the number of subordinate units (for example naselja in an opština), N is the 
total population of the superordinate unit (for example the opština), Nk is the total 
population of subordinate unit k (for example each constituent naselje), Ĥs is the overall 
entropy of the superordinate unit, and HSk is the entropy of each subordinate unit. HT is 
thus a weighted average of the relative differences of the diversity (entropy) of naselja 
from the diversity of their opština. 
 




A simple hypothetical example will suffice to illustrate the difference between HS 
and HT. Suppose two opštine, A and B, each with two naselja, X and Y. AX, AY, BX, 
and BY are of equal size. The population of AX is half of ethnicity E1 and half of E2. 
That of AY is half E1 and half E2. The population of BX is entirely of E1, and that of 
BY is entirely of E2. Both opštine are half E1 and half E2, but in very different ways. A 
is minimally segregated, while B is maximally segregated. Figure 3 illustrates these 
differences. While the mean naselje level entropy of A is higher than that of B, 
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calculation of HT is more revealing than simple comparison of means and is 
conveniently bounded on [0,1]. HT is also additive across aggregation levels.
38 
 
Figure 3:  Diversity vs. segregation 
 
 
Note: Note that E1 and E2 are equally represented in AX and AY. The value of HS in AX and AY is 0.69 in both, as calculated from 
the formula given for HS. It can be simply represented in this case as -1*([0.5*ln(0.5)]+ [0.5*ln(0.5)]). (See also the value shown 
for two groups equally represented, in Figure 2.) This is the maximum attainable value for two ethnic groups. Since AX and AY 
have the same distribution of ethnic groups, the value of HT is at its minimum, namely zero. On the other hand, each ethnic 
group is represented in only one village in the set consisting of BX and BY. Since there is only one group in each of BX and BY 
the value of HS in each of them is zero (since ln(0) is here by definition zero), and in consequence the value of HT is at its 
maximum, namely 1. 
 
 
To give a quick sense of ethnic distributions in Yugoslavia, Table 2 shows that 
despite the great diversity of ethnicities, monoethnicity, i.e., all inhabitants of a naselje 
reported to have the same ethnicity, was sometimes the mode, usually the second most 
frequent pattern, and that having only two ethnic groups in a naselje was usually the 
mode. Only the Voyvodina diverges from this predominance at the lower numbers of 
ethnicities present.
39 Indeed, monoethnicity is the historical norm at the level of the 
village or of the mahala or komšiluk. This tendency to monoethnicity is in part an 
outcome of the traditional cycle of household formation. Household formation among 
most ethnic groups in the Balkans was typically patrilocal; on marriage, a bride and 
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groom resided in the household of the groom’s father. Other brothers (if any) would 
coreside, so that on the death of their father a patrilineally extended household with 
more than one married son would become a fraternal joint one. As the sons (if any) of 
this joint household matured, they would marry (almost always endogamously in 
respect of ethnicity), bringing in their wives, and the adult sons of these brothers would 
be co-resident cousins. Eventually such a household might divide, but its constituent 
sections might continue to live in close proximity. Thus, with any degree of 
demographic growth, the village or mahala would become populated with patrilineally 
related kin, thus of the same ethnic group. Longer range migration might involve such 
complex family units, which would re-establish a monoethnic residential microregion. 
Households of different origin would on migration tend to seek out co-ethnics as 
neighbors even if only on grounds of common religion, a lower potential for 
interhousehold violence, and facilitation of the ethnic marriage market.
40 Table 2 
presages what we will learn in more detailed analysis later: the decline in 
monoethnicity, sometimes ragged, the increase in just a few areas, and the increase in 
1991 in a few of those in which it had previously declined, as the clouds of war began 
to gather. The decline in monoethnicity was driven especially by internal migration 
from diverse monoethnic locations to urban centers, and by the disappearance of small 
villages as the young migrated to cities and the older generation died. To some extent 
this trend was offset at the higher level geographical units, since migrants to the cities 
tended to stay within territories dominated by their own ethnicity – Serbs in Serbia 
tended to relocate within Serbia, and so on (Hoffman 1973, Sharp 1975, Thomas 1979). 
Of course, several demographic processes may play a role in effecting changes in 
diversity and segregation. Migration was probably the most important force just after 
World War II, especially in the deliberate policy to encourage population transfers from 
some so-called “passive” rural areas (notably Hercegovnina) to others, notably to the 
Voyvodina after the expulsion of ethnic Germans. Deliberate restrictions on reverse 
migration limited diversity in Kosovo when Serbs who had left the region during the 
war were for some period not permitted to resettle. It was also important in the 1990s as 
refugee flows changed the ethnic landscape. Differential rates of natural increase also 
have an effect, but the data are difficult to incorporate in analysis. Ethno-specific rates 
of fertility and mortality are not available at the low levels of aggregation at which we 
wish to analyze the data, and they are not easily acquired in machine-readable form for 
censuses before 1991. Nevertheless, it is probably reasonable to assume that the rate of 
natural increase is higher in rural than in urban locations, higher for Albanians, Roma, 
and Muslims-in-the-ethnic-sense, and for other ethnic groups such as Turks that are 
predominantly observant Muslim. Changes in ethnic self-definition may have been 
important. These same processes play a role in more complex measures, such as 
segregation. Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
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Table 2:  Proportion of naselja with n ethnic groups,  
by region and census year 
N Ethnic Groups  Region: 
Date  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10  11  N 
Naselja 
BOS:61 0.213  0.236  0.216 0.159 0.086 0.036 0.021 0.013 0.008 0.011 0.001  6078 
BOS:71 0.208  0.264  0.218 0.146 0.083 0.039 0.016 0.010 0.004 0.009 0.003  5873 
BOS:81 0.169  0.223  0.202 0.169 0.116 0.065 0.024 0.012 0.008 0.006 0.006  5851 
BOS:91  0.282  0.229 0.165 0.152 0.171  *  5488 
CRO:61 0.248  0.281  0.203 0.123 0.058 0.033 0.022 0.013 0.008 0.010 0.001  6756 
CRO:71 0.219  0.255  0.188 0.145 0.075 0.046 0.025 0.017 0.012 0.012 0.005  6675 
CRO:81 0.113  0.181  0.210  0.216  0.124 0.065 0.037 0.020 0.013 0.013 0.008  6623 
CRO:91 0.1330  0.289  0.214 0.227 0.137  *  6293 
KOS:61 0.168  0.227  0.236 0.177 0.097 0.054 0.015 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.007  1437 
KOS:71 0.273  0.278  0.193 0.134 0.061 0.020 0.009 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.009  1435 
KOS:81  0.334  0.233 0.168 0.110 0.064 0.034 0.021 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.009  1444 
KOS:91 * 
MAC:61 0.279  0.332  0.186 0.104 0.039 0.027 0.012 0.009 0.002 0.009 0.000  1696 
MAC:71  0.340  0.330 0.164 0.083 0.041 0.018 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.000  1643 
MAC:81  0.344  0.263 0.177 0.090 0.050 0.029 0.021 0.007 0.005 0.013 0.000  1629 
MAC:91 * 
MNT:61  0.388  0.275 0.142 0.092 0.044 0.016 0.016 0.008 0.010 0.007 0.002  1259 
MNT:71 0.175  0.261  0.226 0.156 0.072 0.044 0.019 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.003  1259 
MNT:81 0.206  0.222  0.205 0.147 0.095 0.054 0.023 0.015 0.015 0.011 0.006  1231 
MNT:91 0.149  0.236  0.233 0.160 0.108 0.048 0.030 0.015 0.007 0.006 0.007  1172 
SLV:61  0.564  0.271 0.104 0.032 0.013 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000  6034 
SLV:71  0.548  0.269 0.099 0.040 0.017 0.010 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.001 0.000  6004 
SLV:81  0.463  0.259 0.121 0.069 0.038 0.020 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.003 0.000  5933 
SLV:91 * 
SRB:61  0.419  0.280 0.120 0.070 0.035 0.021 0.014 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.009  4101 
SRB:71 0.158  0.302  0.219 0.129 0.062 0.037 0.022 0.017 0.018 0.014 0.022  4101 
SRB:81 0.119  0.219  0.235  0.149 0.103 0.061 0.034 0.025 0.014 0.017 0.024  4154 
SRB:91 0.134  0.196  0.229  0.182 0.111 0.059 0.032 0.017 0.013 0.011 0.015  4122 
VOY:61  0.000 0.022 0.033 0.086 0.109 0.140 0.135 0.140 0.151  0.118 0.067  451 
VOY:71  0.002 0.018 0.018 0.035 0.060 0.089 0.135 0.122 0.160 0.153 0.208  451 
VOY:81  0.004 0.009 0.017 0.030 0.045 0.130 0.098 0.105 0.145 0.158 0.259  468 
VOY:91  0.002 0.006 0.004 0.030 0.065 0.112 0.110 0.125 0.134 0.209 0.203  464 
N Naselja  26481  24908  18048 13170 7946 3425 1926 1280 1057 1050  834 100125 
 
Note: BOS=Bosnia, CRO=Croatia, KOS=Kosovo, MAC=Macedonia, MNT=Montenegro, SLV=Slovenia, SRB=Central Serbia, 
VOY=Voyvodina 
* Modal values are italicized. BOS and CRO reported a maximum of five groups in 1991. Macedonia and Slovenia did not 
report at the naselje level in 1991. Data for Kosovo were unusable in 1991. 
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6. Caveats  
A caveat on this and later interpretations of the data, is our inability to assess the 
separate effects of fertility, mortality, migration, and ethnic self-definition on ethnic 
balances. We have no ethnospecific data on fertility and mortality at the lower levels of 
census aggregation, let alone such information that indicates urban versus rural 
settlement. Thus, although we know in general at the national level that Albanian 
fertility rates are higher than Serbian rates, we do not know how great these 
discrepancies are within urban and rural contexts, or within lower level census units. 
Nevertheless, historical observations suggest that although fertility decline in some 
ethnic groups may shift the ethnic balance in some regions (for example, perhaps 
among Serbs in Kosovo), a major driving force in these balances has been migration, 
especially at lower levels of aggregation where occupational diversity is less and social 
conditions more similar among inhabitants (Allcock, op.cit., Ch. 6).
41  
Because of the minor changes in ethnic tabulation in Serbia and Montenegro in the 
1991 census and the drastic changes in Bosnia and Croatia in that year, and since we 
wish to include what we can of data from 1991, we are obliged to modify the system of 
ethnic classification for analysis. There is no perfectly satisfactory way to do that. Table 
1 shows that the standard 11-category system employed 1961-81 was altered in Serbia-
Montenegro in 1991 to add Romanians and Slovaks but transferred to Yugoslav the 
Slovenes and Macedonians.
42 In Bosnia and Croatia in 1991 there were only five 
categories published at the naselje level, and these transferred to Yugoslav or Other 
some groups numerically preponderant in other regions but minor in Croatia and 
Bosnia, such as Albanians and Montenegrins. Thus it is impossible to compare diversity 
or segregation across all census years and regions based on particular ethnic groups, 
since they are not consistently listed. Our solution was to reduce all of the 11-category 
systems to five categories, taking the four most numerous named categories in each 
region separately, and putting all other persons in a fifth category, Other. Note that 
selection of the four most populous categories in each region means that the ethnicities 
so chosen are not the same across the regions.
43 The different nominal identity of the 
five categories has no effect on the calculation of the two indices (HS, HT), although it 
may affect their interpretation. Of the 100,125 observations of naselja across the four 
censuses, 26,481 or 26 percent were monoethnic. Of the remainder, 64,072 or 64 
percent contained from 2 to 5 ethnic groups. Thus for 90 percent of the naselja, the 
reduction to a 5-category system has no effect.
44 Only the remaining 9,572 or 10 
percent contained more than 5 groups.
45 Sixteen percent of these were in the Voyvodina 
and constitute 85 percent of the naselja in that region. The Voyvodina is an outlier. In 
all other regions an average of 9 percent of naselja report more than five groups in any 
census year. Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
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7. Results  
7.1 Diversity (HS)  
Figure 4 is a series of boxplots showing the levels of ethnic diversity (entropy) at the 
levels of naselje, opština, and region, for each region, by census year.
 46 “Serbia” in this 
analysis means Central Serbia (sometimes called in the literature “Serbia Proper”), but 
here not including in any year the opštine of Bujanovac and Preševo because of the data 
deficiencies already noted.
47 Each segment of the series can have up to four boxes, one 
for each census. There is no fourth box for Slovenia, Macedonia, or Kosovo because of 
the absence of useful data.  
Note that each location at the regional level has only one observation, and the plot 
contains only the dot for the median. The variability and skewness of the distributions 
below the region vary inversely with administrative level, greatest for naselja and less 
for opštine. Although the diversity within regions changes over time, roughly speaking 
Voyvodina has the greatest diversity
48, followed closely by Bosnia, then Montenegro, 
then the roughly equivalent Croatia, Kosovo, and Macedonia, then Serbia, then the least 
diverse, Slovenia. It is worth noting that the major element of diversity in Voyvodina is 
the number of ethnic groups reported, while the major element of diversity in Bosnia is 
the near-equal balance between the major groups. 
At the regional level, diversity in Bosnia fell between 1961 and 1971, rebounded 
in 1981, then declined slightly in 1991. The drop in 1971 may be related to the change 
in census protocol, with self-declaration becoming the norm. In Croatia, diversity rose 
steadily 1961-81, then fell slightly in 1991. In Kosovo, diversity fell steadily 1961-81. 
In Macedonia, it did just the reverse. In Montenegro, diversity increased substantially 
1961-91, with a slight dip in 1981. In Slovenia, diversity increased steadily 1961-81. In 
Serbia, it increased 1961-81 with a slight decline in 1991. In Voyvodina, it was steady 
1961-71, increased slightly in 1981, then fell slightly in 1991. Overall, there was 
discernible although irregular increase in six of the regions, no clear change in one, and 
a decline in one.  
At the opština level, the patterns of the medians in most regions are almost 
identical to those at the regional level. However, in Kosovo, there is little change in the 
medians, and the the distributions are more skewed downward over time, with more 
obvious outliers where lessening of diversity was stronger. 
At the naselje level, patterns again mimic those at the regional and opština levels, 
with some exceptions. There is discernible but sometimes irregular increase in five 
regions, no overall change in two, and decline in one. In Kosovo at the naselje level, 
diversity declined just as it did at the regional level. In Macedonia, there is little or no 
change at the naselje level, in contrast to the pattern of increase at higher levels.  Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
Figure 4:  Diversity by census level by census year  
 
 
Note: REG = region, OPS = opština, NAS = naselje BOS = Bosnia, CRO = Croatia, KOS = Kosovo, MAC = Macedonia, MNT = 
Montenegro, SRB = Central Serbia, SLO = Slovenia, VOY = Voyvodina 
 
 
The anomalous pattern at the opština level in Kosovo suggests that persons were 
moving out of naselja where they were in the minority to naselja where they were not, 
but still within the same opština.
49 From Table 2 it is evident that, uniquely among the 
regions of the former Yugoslavia, the percentage of monoethnic naselja in Kosovo rose 
steeply and continuously between 1961 and 1981. Diversity at the opština level would 
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not be changed by intra-opština migration. The downturns in 1991 in most of the 
remaining regions suggest that migration anticipating the wars may have already begun, 
and that inhabitants were leaving locations where they were in the minority. It is also 
possible that individuals were identifying themselves differently as tensions increased. 
Overall, in 17 of the 24 observational frames, the pattern is one of increase in diversity, 
even if slight. Change is negative in only two, and these are both in Kosovo. Five 
frames show effectively no overall change. 
The terminal drop in Bosnia may only be part of a fluctuating pattern of diversity 
of varying cause. The underlying raw data show that the proportion reporting Muslim 
ethnicity was 0.26, 0.40, 0.40, 0.44 in the successive censuses. There appears to be no 
simple trade-off with the reporting of Yugoslav identity, which appears as 0.08, 0.01, 
0.08, 0.05. Nevertheless, some shift in ethnic identification must have played a role (see 
Mrdjen 2002). The proportions reporting as Croat or Serb both show steady decline, 
while the proportions reporting as Other (which would include some persons declining 
to identify an ethnicity) show a steady but slight increase. We have no direct 
information on internal migration rates by ethnicity, but unknown changes in rates of 
natural increase in the different ethnic groups may play a role. Similarly, we have no 
direct information on the propensity to report alternative ethnicity. 
 
 
7.2 Segregation (HT)  
Figure 5 examines segregation patterns. Note that only two levels are examined – 
opština and region, since segregation cannot be calculated at the lowest (naselje) level. 
As before, there is only one observation per region and thus only the median dot is 
shown at that level.  
Fischer et al. (2004)
50 suggest that changes in HT as small as 0.02 are substantively 
important. Whether they are statistically significant we address in a later section. We 
focus on the period 1961-1981, with separate comments on any shifts 1981-1991, 
because of the lack of adequate data after 1981 for some regions (Kosovo, Slovenia, 
Macedonia). Figure 5 shows that segregation had a fairly consistent downward trend in 
15 of the 16 observational frames (eight regions at the regional and opština levels), with 
the exception of Kosovo and Montenegro at the opština level. However Montenegro 
does show a stronger decrease 1971-1981 than does Kosovo. Of the 24 intercensal 
changes (3 intercensal periods in 8 regions), three, as noted, have no data in 1991. (See 
Table 3 where the observed median differences 1961-1981 are tabulated). Of the 
remaining 21 frames, all observed changes in the medians are negative, and they are 
negative by more than 0.02 except the small positive shift in 1981 at the opština level in 
Kosovo and Montenegro and the regional level in the latter. Both Croatia and Serbia Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
show small increases in segregation 1981-1991. These shifts in Croatia and Serbia may 
reflect changes (in residence or reporting habits) of members of the Serb minority in 
Croatia or of the Croatian minority in the Voyvodina county of Srem. Large numbers of 
Serbs were displaced from Croatia after 1991, but some anticipatory changes may have 
occurred and may have involved reciprocal property exchanges and relocations (see 
Čapo-Žmegač 2007 on such changes after 1991). Despite these sorts of irregularities, 
the overall trend toward decreased segregation is striking. 
 
Figure 5:  Segregation by census level by census year 
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8. Statistical significance  
How significant are the patterns that we observe? Could they be the result of chance 
alone? The question is complex.  
 
1.  The data examined here are not a sample but the universe of data collected. We 
should not ask the question of significance in the usual framework of assessment 
of sampling error. 
 
2.  We can, however, rephrase the question as one about measurement error and try to 
approach it by bootstrapping (Efron and Tibshirani 1993). We decided to ask the 
simplest and most fundamental question: did the observed change in the median 
entropy (segregation) between 1961 and 1981 exceed a level that could reasonably 
be attributed to random variation? We did not include 1991 for two reasons: (1) the 
absence of useful data for three regions in 1991 and (2) the clear change in slope 
from 1981 to 1991 in some regions and the complexity that would be introduced 
by trying to test a nonmonotonic pattern. It is important to note that this test of 
change from 1961 to 1981 examines only those two time points and does not 
address any nonlinearity, such as can be seen in the more informative boxplots. 
Nevertheless, this limited test does address the issue of the reliability of our 
interpretations by focusing on a subset that reflects the general problem of the 
reliability of the census and the sensitivity of interpretations to random error. Our 
procedure is as follows: 
-  The data set contains 100,125 observations of naselja in four census years. 
We draw 1,000 samples with replacement from this universe of observations. 
By drawing with replacement we create 1,000 “bootstrap samples” each of 
which has 100,125 observations. In each such bootstrap sample, some naselja 
in that region and that year will appear once, some will be repeated perhaps 
several times, others will be left out, because we sampled randomly and 
repeatedly with replacement. (Think of this sampling with replacement as 
fishing in a pond, catching a fish, throwing it back, and fishing some more. 
You are unlikely to catch every fish in the pond, but you are likely to catch 
the same one more than once.) We can use the standard deviation of the 
differences of the medians calculated from the bootstrap samples as an 
estimate of the true standard deviation.
51 For analysis of each census (region x 
year) we discard observations that are not in the region and the census year 
we are testing. In this way the structure of the bootstrap parallels that of the 
boxplots. Further, by making the tests region and time specific, we avoid the Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
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introduction of irrelevant variance between regions and censuses at the 
different dates. 
-  We generate Z statistics for the difference between median naselje level 
entropy in each republic in 1961 and 1981 as well as differences in opština 
and regional level entropy and segregation over the same period. (Recall that 
segregation cannot be examined at the naselje level.) 
 
3.  Table 3 shows the results. We ask whether the observed difference is likely to have 
occurred by chance alone, and we judge that likelihood as described above. 
Because our interpretations are directional, we double the usual critical value of 
alpha (0.05) to 0.10, and we accordingly mark as “significant” (in italics) those p-
values that are less than 0.10.  
 
4.  Naselje Diversity: The p-values for naselje diversity are all vanishingly close to 
zero. None of the observed differences between the median diversity of naselja in 
1961 and 1981 in any region are likely to have occurred by chance alone. Note, 
however that Figure 4 is more informative. The overall pattern for Bosnia is one of 
fluctuation that is, on average, flat. Croatia, Serbia, and Voyvodina show a 
flattening or downturn in 1991. While the decline in Macedonia is unlikely to be 
the result of chance alone, it is quite small on average, and the overall pattern over 
time is flat. 
 
5.  Opština diversity: All but two results are unlikely to have occurred by chance 
alone. The two exceptions are Bosnia and Kosovo. In neither of these regions do 
the boxplots show any important change between the two census dates, hence the 
high p value, since what we see in the differences between medians is estimates of 
zero.  
 
6.  Opština segregation: In five of the regions the difference between the observed 
median difference and the bootstrapped median difference has a p-value close to 
zero. In Kosovo and Montenegro the pattern between 1961 and 1981 is irregular or 
flat, meaning effectively no change. The observed differences in medians are 
insufficiently different from zero to exclude chance alone as their cause, 
confirming our judgment. The situation for Macedonia is different. The boxplot 
shows segregation to have declined, but the bootstrapping shows that the observed 
median difference (which is negative) had a probability of 0.1006 of occurring by 
chance alone, thus implying that change in Macedonia may have been flat, if we 
strictly interpret the alpha level. On the other hand, if we were to bet money on our Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
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interpretation of the graphical result, we would enjoy odds of 9:1; that is not a bet 
we would refuse. 
 
7.  Examining regional diversity we see that in all regions but Bosnia the p values are 
below 0.10. In Bosnia again, the pattern of fluctuation means that there was 
effectively no difference between 1961 and 1981, which is just what the bootstrap 
shows. 
 
8.  Examining now regional segregation, we see that all but two p values are less than 
alpha. The exceptions are Kosovo and Montenegro. Both of these slopes from 
1961 to 1981 are very small. If the comparison in Montenegro had been 1961-1991 
the difference, seen from the boxplots, would have been steeper. While we would 
have judged both cases to have shown decline, we must admit that at these modest 
declines, a small drop is not far from zero. 
 
9.  The upshot of this testing between 1961 and 1981 is that although we could not 
apply a general test across all four censuses in all eight regions, bootstrapping 
shows that where we could conduct a reasonable inferential test, our judgments 
were on the whole reliable. The doubtful cases are those in which a very slight 
decline cannot be easily distinguished from no decline, at the chosen alpha level. 
But in our view, art trumps probability theory. That our interpretations of the 
boxplots were clearly correct in almost all cases strengthens our view that in the 
marginal cases we were probably not far off target. 
 
 







Mean Difference  Z p 
Naselje Diversity 
BOS  0.0605   0.0601    0.0098    6.1586   0.0000 
CRO  0.1543   0.1539    0.0040    38.5852   0.0000 
KOS   -0.1101   -0.1105    0.0145    -7.5688   0.0000 
MAC   -0.0080   -0.0079    0.0030    -2.6654   0.0038 
MNT  0.1080   0.1083    0.0091    11.9290   0.0000 
SLV   0.0344    0.0342    0.0023    15.1044   0.0000 
SRB   0.0664   0.0661    0.0017    38.4875   0.0000 
VOY  0.1588   0.1612    0.0499    3.1827   0.0007 
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Mean Difference  Z p 
Opština Diversity 
BOS  0.0291   0.0138    0.0290    1.0046    0.1575 
CRO  0.3123   0.3091    0.0306    10.2135   0.0000 
KOS   -0.0128   -0.0467    0.0691    -0.1850    0.4266 
MAC  0.1075   0.1194    0.0449    2.3941   0.0083 
MNT  0.3334   0.2928    0.0738    4.5179   0.0000 
SLV   0.1469    0.1444    0.0172    8.5384   0.0000 
SRB   0.2294   0.2133    0.0156    14.7072   0.0000 
VOY  0.1677   0.1613    0.0379    4.4230   0.0000 
 Opština Segregation 
BOS   -0.0981   -0.0933  0.0227    -4.3287   0.0000 
CRO   -0.0671   -0.0515  0.0123    -5.4656   0.0000 
KOS  0.0039   0.0188  0.0557    0.0707    0.4718 
MAC   -0.0590   -0.0384  0.0462    -1.2783    0.1006 
MNT   -0.0331   -0.0584  0.0353    -0.9355    0.1748 
SLV   -0.0420    -0.0384  0.0129    -3.2502   0.0006 
SRB   -0.0302   -0.0219  0.0080    -3.7831   0.0001 
VOY   -0.0911   -0.0567  0.0320    -2.8495   0.0022 
Regional Diversity 
BOS  0.0108   0.0106  0.0216    0.4999    0.3086 
CRO  0.1866   0.1881  0.0226    8.2515   0.0000 
KOS   -0.1310   -0.1348  0.0496    2.6408   0.0041 
MAC  0.1773   0.1764  0.0622    2.8483   0.0022 
MNT  0.3054   0.3100  0.0726    4.2083   0.0000 
SLV   0.2040    0.2027  0.0240    8.4897   0.0000 
SRB   0.2516   0.2490  0.0429    5.8624   0.0000 
VOY  0.0806   0.0793  0.0533    1.5123   0.0652 
Regional Segregation 
BOS   -0.0458   -0.0462  0.0172    2.6592   0.0039 
CRO   -0.1474   -0.1537  0.0184    8.0283   0.0000 
KOS   -0.0218   -0.0167  0.0261    0.8353    0.2018 
MAC   -0.1000   -0.0906  0.0418    2.3913   0.0084 
MNT   -0.0212   -0.0193  0.0482    0.4387    0.3304 
SLV   -0.0879    -0.0901  0.0251    3.4968   0.0002 
SRB   -0.1513   -0.1551  0.0379    3.9873   0.0000 
VOY   -0.0675   -0.0768  0.0284    2.3808   0.0086 
 
Note:   Observed Median Difference is the observed difference between the medians of this variable in 1961 and 1981 at this census 
level (see figures 4 and 5). Bootstrap Mean Difference is the mean of the differences of the medians in 1961 and 1981 in the 
1000 bootstrap resamplings, and SD Bootstrap Mean Difference is the standard error of this mean. Z is the Z-score for the 
deviation of this mean from zero. p is the probability of that deviation by chance alone. Since our interpretation of the boxplots 
is specifically directional, by region, a p-value of < 0.10 might be interpreted as statistically significant (shown in italics).  
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9. Implications of opština boundary changes  
As already noted, naselja that are almost surely the same places in different censuses 
are sometimes located in different opštine. The extent of these changes varies greatly 
across regions, and changes are most frequent in the first decade. Preliminary analysis 
shows that a common outcome of opština boundary shifts is to increase the measure of 
segregation. There are two plausible conjectures to explain the changes. The first is that 
they reflect ethnic gerrymandering, strongest in the earliest period but diminishing. The 
second is that they are an inevitable result of combining relatively monoethnic but 
ethnically different opštine side by side in a new opština, as improvements in 
communications allowed simplification of the administrative structure of government.
52 




10. Some supplemental evidence  
Botev (1994) offers a sophisticated analysis of ethnic endogamy and exogamy in 
Yugoslavia from about the beginning of our data up to a few years before its end. 
Marriage event data are not recorded in the censuses; only marital status is. Botev uses 
event data from annual statistical reports, at the regional level. He is skeptical about 
journalistic reports that focus on the disruption of interethnic marriages by interethnic 
conflict (as are we) and sees no consistent trend in the incidence of interethnic 
marriages. There is an apparent contradiction between his results and ours. Botev sees 
no consistent trend in the degree of exogamy by region. We do see trends in the ethnic 
diversity of regions. Indeed, our results on ethnic diversity at the regional level are in 
rough agreement with Botev’s basic data on proportions of exogamic marriage in six of 
the eight regions. What we describe is the local residential population at various levels, 
approximately the structure of supply in the marriage market. Our results (on residence) 
are in rough concordance with Botev’s raw data on marriage events; the simple 
conclusion from this concordance is that the structure of supply was changing but 
demand was relatively constant. In an interesting log-linear analysis, Botev identifies 
the structure of marital preferences. Given those preferences, marriage events are still 
conditioned by the supply of potential spouses, which we show to be moving toward 
greater local diversity. A caveat on this discussion, and on Botev’s results, is that the 
marriage market in the former Yugoslavia was not strictly local and may have 
transcended regional boundaries. See also Mrdjen’s discussion of interethnic marriages 
(Mrjden 1996). 
Kuzmanović (1994) summarizes surveys of “social distance” between particular 
ethnic groups in Yugoslavia. The surveys asked respondents of ethnicity A whether Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
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they would accept a person of ethnicities B…X in particular social relationships, 
ranging from coresidence in the same country to marriage with a close relative of the 
respondent. Surveys of this kind had been carried out in Yugoslavia between 1960 and 
1990 (see Bogardus 1926 on the fundamental concepts of social distance). The surveys 
are not identical in the ethnic structure of their samples, the questions are not identical, 
and there are other formal differences between them, so that close comparison is not 
possible. One must also take the veracity of responses with a grain of salt; almost 
surely, given official government attitudes toward ethnic relations, respondents were 
likely to give politically safe answers. Nevertheless, the results are illuminating. 
According to Kuzmanović the earlier surveys manifest perceived distance between 
ethnic groups in Yugoslavia that is relatively low in comparison to that found in other, 
modern, multi-ethnic countries. Even in the time of economic and political crises in the 
1980s, the level of ethnic intolerance (as expressed in the survey responses) was 
relatively low. By 1990, with the outbreak of violent rebellion in the Serb-dominated 
areas of Croatia, surveys show much higher perceived distance. Kuzmanović concludes 
that the political quarrels and economic rivalries between the republics led to an 
increase in expressed inter-ethnic antagonism that peaked especially after the outbreak 
of open hostilities between the Serbian-controlled JNA (Yugoslav National Army) and 
breakaway forces in Slovenia and Croatia. Prior to that, the data appear to show that 
interethnic antagonism was usually lower in the more diverse republics than in the more 
homogeneous ones. One might then expect that in the absence of armed conflict, the 




11. Summary, reflections, and conclusion  
Using two commonly employed measures of ethnic diversity and segregation, we 
examined the censuses of Yugoslavia 1961-91. We did not attempt coverage before 
1961 because the systems of administrative organization and the categorization of 
ethnicity varied too much from those employed 1961-91. Even inclusion of data from 
1991 posed problems, requiring a simplification of ethnic classification.  
Our interpretations of the data are subject to an important caveat about the 
meaning of data on ethnicity. These data can be regarded as information on the true 
ethnic origins of persons or as information on how persons wished to present 
themselves. The first alternative presupposes that persons know what their “true ethnic 
origins” are, a difficult task even for obsessive genealogists, given the history of 
intentional or fortuitous mixture of ethnic groups in the region. The second alternative 
presupposes that persons respond to questions about their ethnic identity in a way that Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
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furthers their political interests, especially in a country in which census takers may be 
regarded as agents of the police. Under the first alternative, our data show that 
coresidential ethnic mixture was on the whole objectively increasing. Under the second, 
our data show that respondents felt increasingly at ease in representing themselves as 
members of other than the regionally dominant ethnic group. The political implications 
of the two alternatives are the same. 
The extraordinary ethnic diversity of the territory of Yugoslavia was historically 
one of local mono-ethnicity, expanding to multi-ethnicity in ever larger geographical 
units. Imperial conquest, refugee flight, and more recently urbanization and the 
disappearance of small, usually monoethnic, rural settlements over time resulted in 
greater mixture of the population. Over the period 1961-91 diversity at all levels mostly 
increased, and segregation mostly decreased. Where exceptions appear, such as in 
Kosovo, there is a longer recent history of severe ethnic conflict, leading to separation, 
rather than integration, of rival ethnic groups. While we do not yet have detailed data at 
all local levels to support the assertion, it is apparent from general information that the 
refugee flows during, following, and to some extent before the wars of separation have 
reversed the trends toward integration seen in the census data 1961-91. Indeed, events 
in Kosovo even during that period suggest that political rivalry and separatist politics 
were instrumental in triggering ethnic separation.  
There can be no question that ethnic hostility has a long history in the region, bred 
of conflicts between empires and their ethnic surrogates. There can be no question but 
that these conflicts have erupted with sufficient frequency over historical time so that 
every generation has been subject to atrocity or tales of it. Nevertheless, two factors 
seemed to dampen such resurgence. One was state policy, perhaps most draconian in 
Yugoslavia after 1945, in which even telling or collecting ethnic jokes was subject to 
penalty.
54 The other was the inexorable march of industrialization and urbanization that 
mixed together populations that had previously lived in isolation, sometimes achieving 
diversity by deliberate encouragement of internal migration, as in the replacement of 
expelled German-speaking (Volksdeutsche) populations of the Voyvodina by 
inhabitants from distant Yugoslav areas. General measures of social distance between 
ethnic groups appear also to have increased as hostilities intensified, but are inversely 
correlated with local diversity.
55  
Let us revisit the broader questions raised at the outset. How do we understand our 
puzzle: the eruption of violence in the 1990s that dismembered Yugoslavia along ethnic 
lines into its separate republics, that has split Kosovo from Serbia, and that may yet 
split Bosnia into three parts? Although our interest in this analysis is careful 
measurement of diversity and segregation, we cannot avoid this political question, even 
though it is not within our competence to answer it. The literature on ethnic relations, 
ethnic politics, and the organization of polities is vast, even if focused just on Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
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Yugoslavia. We cannot attempt to review it but simply proceed to consider the obvious 
alternatives. 
Perhaps the most discouraging interpretation of the flow of historical events is that 
increasing diversity itself led to interethnic antipathy. Although direct evidence from 
surveys of interethnic attitudes is not as strong as we might wish, that explanation 
seems unlikely. Antipathy as expressed in the surveys appears to decrease with 
increased diversity. Further, strong evidence of interethnic antipathy seems to have 
appeared only after the outbreak of open conflict. 
An alternative explanation would be that ethnic dissension was held in check by an 
authoritarian government until the discipline of the League of Communists was 
undermined by economic and constitutional crises after Tito’s death in 1980. This is the 
most plausible of the alternatives.
56 Economic rivalry between the republics, and 
resentment over large transfers from the wealthier regions (Slovenia, Croatia, and to 
some extent Serbia) to the poorer ones (Kosovo, Macedonia) grew during the 1980s. 
Since the 1970s the central government had pursued a path of decentralization and 
federalization, granting virtual autonomy even to the regions of Serbia that did not have 
the status of republics (Kosovo, Voyvodina). This course proved impossible to reverse 
and aroused secessionist tendencies simply on a regional basis but easily transformed 
into inter-ethnic resentment.
57 Playing the ethnic card may simply have been a 
convenient option for politicians seeking broad support.  
Other actors, European and American, dithered until it was too late. It has been 
said that the alacrity of German recognition of Croatia and Slovenia after their 
secession, contrary to the position of the European Union, brought to mind the 
alignments of 1914 and 1941 (Crawford 1996). The United States and NATO were 
reluctant to protect the populations of Yugoslavia from nationalist frenzy until the 
military situation was hopeless. Why? By 1991 there were tectonic shifts in the power 
relationships of European states. Exhausted by the war in Afghanistan, plagued by 
economic difficulties, Party hegemony weakened by glasnost, the Soviet Union was 
collapsing. The Berlin Wall had come down in 1989. Yugoslavia was no longer 
important to the West as a client and entry point to the socialist and Third worlds, as an 
example of a socialist state independent of the USSR. Burdened by foreign debt, 
challenged by demands from the International Monetary Fund for repayment and 
recentralization of its banking system, suffering from hyperinflation and 
unemployment, unable to control its otherwise laudable efforts toward federalism, 
Yugoslavia would have needed firm support from the EU and NATO. Efforts to create 
a customs union or arrange entry into the European Union would have helped. That 
support was not forthcoming.
58  
Given the notion of constitutive ethnicities, Yugoslavia tore apart on lines 
established in its own charter. With the authority and solidarity of the League of Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
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Communists diminished, with an ideology that denied class distinctions and thus an 
alternative scenario for alignment, and with a one-party system, ethnicity as a political 
mobilizer was the only convenient organizational alternative (Allcock op. cit., Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967).  
There is nothing in the demographic record to suggest that ethnic separatism was 
inevitable, absent the emergence of economic and political rivalry at the highest levels 
of government. Although Yugoslav society had its share of ethnic intolerance, there is 
nothing in the population record to suggest that intolerance by itself would have led to 
mass separatism. Our contribution has only been to add to the evidence information on 
population distribution that has not been part of the debate. That information supports 
the arguments put forth by Allcock, Denitch, and Woodward, among others, that the 
collapse of Yugoslavia was from the top. As the Serbian proverb prophetically informs 
us, this fish did stink from the head. 
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Notes 
 
1 Translation of the Serbian proverb, “Riba smrdi od glave”. This proverb is 
widely known in other European languages and is often attributed to the philosopher 
Erasmus (c.1466-1538) as Piscis primum a capite foetet, although it may have an older 
Greek origin.  
2 Later censuses for some successor states exist but vary even more in coverage 
and format and are not all at the same date. A carefully controlled comparative 
examination of the data after 1991 is not feasible at this time. There is also a rich 
literature on the social, political, and humanitarian outcomes of the violent collapse of 
Yugoslavia, especially regarding Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, and the Serbian exodus 
from Croatia. These works are primarily from a political science or humanitarian 
perspective, and we do not discuss them here because they fall outside of our time 
range. 
3 Ethnic relations in the workplace are also important especially given the 
Yugoslav practice of workers’ self management. However the census gives us no 
information on workplace ethnic distributions. 
4 The literature on this topic is enormous. Excellent overviews from sociology, 
political science, and anthropology are: Allcock (2000), Denitch (1994), Woodward 
(1995) and Halpern and Kideckel (2000). For an extensive view of similar issues in 
what have been called the wars of the communist succession, see Kaufman (2001). For 
problems in state formation in the Balkans, see Weiner (1971). For a general theory of 
geographical factors in ethnic violence, see Toft (2003). See also Goldstone (2002), 
Hammel (1993, 1997, 2000), Hayden (1996), Kertzer and Arel (2002), Slack and 
Doyon (2001), Urdal (2001), and Weiner and Teitelbaum  (2001). 
5 This first “Yugoslavia” was initially named the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes. By virtue of its status as a large independent state rather than a part of any 
empire in 1914 (Croatia and Slovenia were part of Austria-Hungary, Macedonia part of 
the Ottoman Empire, Montenegro was small), and as an independent combatant against 
Austria-Hungary and the Ottomans, Serbia was given pride of place. Thus the seeds of 
dissension were sown. 
6 Presumably, these majority stakes were calculated at the level of the municipality 
in order to show differences within the superordinate level of the republic or 
autonomous region. 
7 For brevity we use the word, Bosnia, throughout to mean Bosnia-Hercegovina. 
Similarly, we use the word Kosovo throughout to mean Kosovo and Metohija. Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
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8 Indeed reliance on language as ethnic identifier was an important aspect of the 
decisions of the Paris Peace Conference, although ironically it stemmed from the 
German Romanticist trend initiated by Herder, Goethe, and the brothers Grimm. 
9 Some of these are spoken of course only by small populations. Some are related 
to one another at a more general level. Even at that higher level there is extraordinary 
diversity, with representation from Slavic (Serbian, Croatian, Bulgarian, Bosnian, 
Macedonian, Slovenian, Slovak), Romance (Italian, Venetian, Istriot, and various 
Romanian languages), Albanian, Indo-Aryan (several Romani languages), Caucasian 
(Circassian), Ugric (Hungarian), and Altaic (several Turkic languages). Most of those 
listed are Indo-European but sometimes distantly related, while others are not related to 
one another or to the Indo-European set. German is not included in this list. Before the 
end of World War II there were substantial populations of German speakers in the 
Voyvodina who had settled there when the region was under Austro-Hungarian control. 
Jews are not included; there were Sephardic populations of considerable depth in 
Bosnia and Serbia prior to World War II, speaking Ladino as well as the local Slavic 
language. Some Ashkenazim lived in Croatia and surrounds, speaking Yiddish as well 
as the local Slavic language. See www.ethnologue.com. 
10 For example, the qeleshe, a white felt skullcap worn by Albanian men, the 
crnogorska kapa worn by Montenegrin men, the šajkača, a military cap like the U.S. 
garrison cap or French bonnet de police worn by Serbian men, the fez worn by Muslim 
men. Muslim women in the countryside often wear dimije , “harem pants”, but in urban 
contexts may simply wear a head covering. Ethnic differences of costume between non-
Muslim women are more subtle and found mostly in the countryside . 
11 The complexity of interethnic relations and of the Yugoslav people to their 
imperial overlords can be illustrated anecdotally. In 1961, Ivo Andrić was awarded the 
Nobel Prize in Literature for a work entitled, in English, A Bridge on the Drina. The 
Drina River is the border between Bosnia and Serbia. In the book, the bridge is a 
metaphor for interethnic relations between Muslims, Christians, and Jews. Interestingly, 
Andrić does not use the usual Serbo-Croatian word for “bridge” (most) in his title, but 
the word ćuprija. Ćuprija is the Turkish word for bridge. The bridge is an historical 
one, at Višegrad, and still stands, having been blown up by the Austrians in World War 
I, by the Germans in World War II, and by paramilitaries in the war of the 1990s, but 
subsequently repaired each time. It was commissioned and financed by Mehmed Paša 
Sokolović in the 16
th century. Mehmed Paša Sokolović was the Grand Vizier of the 
Ottoman Empire, who served three sultans, including Suleiman the Magnificent. One 
may wonder at his surname: he was also a Serb, who had been conscripted as a young 
boy into the Janissaries. It is this bridge, built by a Serb in Ottoman clothing, that 
Andrić celebrates as a metaphor of ethnic relations. As if this were not enough, we note 
that Andrić has often been identified as a Bosnian Serb. He was in fact born a Bosnian Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
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Croat and was an observant Catholic. In his student days before World War I, he 
associated with radical Serbian organizations fighting against Habsburg rule, 
organizations that had among their members Gavrilo Princip, who assassinated 
Archduke Ferdinand in 1914. Andrić served some time in prison for his political 
activities. So much for simple views of ethnic nationalism.  
12 Yugoslavia exhibits a transition process from the “fixed ethnicity” notion typical 
of some European states to the more flexible and situational view now exemplified in 
the United States. See for example Simić (2007). 
13 It is not within the scope of this paper to chronicle the collapse of Yugoslavia, 
but we give some interesting details. The collapse may be said to have begun with the 
14
th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugslavia. At that Congress, the 
delegates of Croatia and Slovenia walked out on January 20, 1990, frustrated by the 
maneuvers of Slobodan Milošević, who had gained control of the votes of Serbia, 
Kosovo, Voyvodina, and Montenegro, thus 4 of 8. Separatist politicians in all regions 
began to advance their own agendas. Ultimately even Milošević adopted a Serbian 
nationalist position rather than the hegemonic Yugoslav one that he held originally. See 
especially Allcock (2000), Denitch (1994), and Woodward (1995). 
14 For example, while most Albanians are Muslim, some are Catholic and a few are 
Orthodox. Some Muslims are ethnic Turks. A few Serbs in Dubrovnik are Catholic. 
15 A large proportion of the Albanian population in Kosovo and the two 
municipalities of Bujanovac and Preševo in Central Serbia refused to participate in the 
census. We omit Kosovo in 1991 from the analysis, so that our results for that region 
describe only its characteristics 1961-1981. We omit Bujanovac and Preševo from the 
analysis 1961-1981 as well as in 1991, because to include them before 1991 would 
misrepresent comparisons for Central Serbia across the range 1961-1991. Similarly, we 
omit Slovenia and Macedonia from analysis in 1991 because the tabulations available 
are only at the opština level. 
16 From the verb seliti, “to settle”, thus “settlement”. Cf. selo, “village”. We use 
the nominative case (singular or plural, as appropriate) of Serbo-Croatian nouns 
throughout. On pronunciation, render š as English sh in shoe, č as English ch in church, 
ć as the exaggerated palatalized ct in English picture, ž as the voiced form of š, 
approximately as ge in French fromage. 
17 That naselja were the smallest administrative units does not imply that they were 
always small demographic units. Many naselja are tiny villages. On the other hand, the 
naselje of Novi Sad, seat of the opština of Novi Sad in the Voyvodina, had almost 
180,000 inhabitants in 1991. 
18 For example, by 1991 most or all of the locations named for Tito (e.g., Titograd, 
Titovo Užice, or heroes of the revolution, e.g., Ivangrad, had reverted to their earlier Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
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denominations, e.g. Podgorica, Užice, Berane, respectively. It is not always easy, 
without local political knowledge, to know what the predecessor names were. 
19 The problems of consistent identification of a given geographical location over 
time could be easily solved if the censuses contained information on latitude and 
longitude or if they assigned a unique identifier to each naselje. No such list exists, at 
least not in public form, except a list with unique numerical identifiers for Serbia in 
2001. There do exist gazetteers of geographical place names, including populated 
places, and giving latitude and longitude, but they are not easy to use (e.g., http://earth-
info.nga.mil/gns/html/index.html). First, they are the result of the scanning of maps 
issued by different governments, in different languages, at different dates. Second, they 
do not indicate the opština to which a naselje belongs administratively. The first defect 
means that it would be very difficult to decide how to include information from maps in 
English, German, Hungarian, Italian and Albanian and whether the names listed in them 
were the equivalents of the Serbo-Croatian names in the censuses. The second defect 
means that it would be difficult to decide whether two identically spelled naselje names 
on the lists were the same place or two different places with the same name, because the 
opština names for the naselje are not given. Naselje names are apparently never 
duplicated within an opština but they are often duplicated across different opštine. 
Finally, the naselje names given on the maps may vary in spelling both among 
themselves or from those in the census, just as those names differ across censuses. GIS 
data (points and polygons) are now available for locations in the former Yugoslavia, but 
their use in our work demands prior careful articulation of the place name data with the 
census name data (which cover a longer time span than the geographical names data). 
That is an arduous task that we have not yet undertaken. 
20 We did attempt provisional assignment of unique identifiers for naselje names. 
These were catenations of the region name, the opština name, and the naselje name. We 
call this construction a cname. For example, the cname 
CRN:IVANGRAD:IVANGRAD depicts (reading right to left) the naselje of Ivangrad 
in the opština of IVANGRAD in CRNA GORA (Montenegro). We then compared the 
cnames within each region across censuses. Minor differences could be detected in 
many comparisons. For example, the abbreviation for “Saint” in a place name might 
differ. Where such minor differences were detected, we changed the cname in the 
earlier census to the form observed in the later census. Our confidence in these matches 
was high if the difference in names was minor and had an easy explanation, as in the 
example just noted, and especially so if the two naselje names were in the same opština 
in both censuses. These simple cases are the most common. Some instances were more 
difficult, for example if an opština seat itself was renamed, as was the case with 
CRN:IVANGRAD:IVANGRAD 1961-1981 and its transformation to 
CRN:BERANE:BERANE in 1991. There is no linguistic clue to the fact that these are Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
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the same place on the ground. We did not use the renamed cnames as identifiers to 
create time series of places across the four censuses for our main analysis. 
21 See Mrdjen 2002 for a perceptive review of ethnic classification in the Yugoslav 
censuses. 
22 narod, “folk, a people, cf. German Volk”, pl. narodi. 
23  narodnost, “ethnicity”, pl. narodnosti. The difference between narod and 
narodnosti is approximately that in English between nation and nationality. 
24 Albanians have been the majority population in Kosovo in modern times and 
arguably for much of the later Ottoman period. Serbs displaced from Kosovo during 
World War II were initially forbidden to return after 1945 in order to placate the 
Albanian population. The lower Serbian birth rate and Serbian emigration out of 
Kosovo have intensified the Albanian majority. (See Hammel and Stevanović 2004 
Petrović and Blagojević 1989,1992.) Serbs have a majority in the Voyvodina, but the 
Hungarian minority is large. The population of Bosnia was approximately 20 percent 
Croatian, 30 percent Serbian, and 40 percent Muslim in 1981. Thus, Muslims had only 
a plurality, and their designation as the constitutive ethnicity would have been difficult. 
As of this writing the official Bosnian position is that Croatian, Serbian, and Bosniak 
are now all constitutive ethnicities. However, Bosniak politicians appear to be resisting 
the reporting of ethnicity in any census (http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Svet/Boshnjaci-
politizuju-popis-stanovnishtva-u-BiH.sr.html, 27 August 2009.) (We are obliged to 
Prof. Andrei Simić for this reference.) It is also important to note that the revision of the 
Yugoslav constitution in 1974 paid special attention to issues of ethnic identity, partly 
by granting greater autonomy to Kosovo and the Voyvodina, where there were large 
non-Serbian populations. At the same time the particular ethnic consciousness of 
Bosnian Muslims was increasing, so that a particular Bosnian Muslim identity, 
“Bosniak”, began to emerge out of the formerly residual category of “unallocated” 
Muslims. We are obliged to an anonymous reviewer for stressing this point. We 
speculate that any previous attempt to designate Muslim Slavs in Bosnia as a particular 
ethnic group might have met determined and potentially violent opposition from 
Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, who together amounted to between half and two-
thirds of the Bosnian population. Indeed, that is just what happened after the League of 
Communists lost political control in 1990. 
25 King Alexander I of the first Yugoslavia attempted to deal with the problems of 
regional ethnic predominance by re-establishing  new administrative regions (banovine) 
that crosscut the traditional regions. He was assassinated for his pains in 1934 by a 
coalition of Macedonian and Croatian separatists (IMRO and Ustaše). 
26 The constitution and the census instructions are very explicit in their emphasis 
that Muslim is to be understood “in the ethnic sense” and not in the religious sense. Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
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27 The phrase, jugoslovensko poreklo (Yugoslav origin) is not to be understood 
only in the territorial but also in the ethnic sense. It refers to southern Slavs of 
Yugoslavia, but not to persons of other ethnicity from that same territory, e.g., 
Albanians. 
28 It is interesting to observe that major urban cemeteries are often divided into 
separate sections by religion. There is a section for Catholics, one for Orthodox, one for 
Muslims, one for Jews. There is also a section for Communists, presumably so that they 
would not be obliged to declare a religious affiliation in order to be buried, or because 
their political affiliation was regarded as an alternative orthodoxy. 
29 We are obliged to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting that “Yugoslav” might 
provide a convenient alternative to specification of a single identity. 
30 We may reflect on what it would mean for a resident of the U.S. to respond to 
the race or ethnicity questions of the census with “American”. See the careful treatment 
of the political meanings of ethnicity by Allcock (2000), especially Ch. 10, 11, 12, 14 et 
passim. Note also the specific manipulation of ethnic declaration, as for example in the 
claim that some Muslim Albanians reported that they were ethnic Turks, in order to 
enhance the possibility of their emigration/ “repatriation” to Turkey. 
31 In 1961 the Yugoslav category ranked in the top 5 ethnic categories (including 
Other) only in Bosnia, not in any of the other seven regions. Since the purported 
Yugoslav-Muslim tradeoff was probably important only or at least primarily in Bosnia, 
it is unlikely that the lack of this tradeoff played a role anywhere else in 1961. 
In 1971 the Yugoslav category ranked in the top 5 in all but 3 regions (Kosovo, 
Macedonia, Slovenia), thus in 5 regions. Since the Yugoslav-Muslim tradeoff was 
primarily a Bosnian phenomenon, the emergence of the Yugoslav category in the 
remaining 4 regions (excluding Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Slovenia) can only be 
explained by some other mechanism. 
In 1981 the Yugoslav category ranked in the top 5 in all but Kosovo and 
Macedonia, thus in 6 regions. The same arguments apply in 1981 as in 1971, with 
Slovenia included. 
In 1991 the Yugoslav category ranked in the top 5 of all 5 reporting regions. 
Probably if Slovenia, Kosovo, and Macedonia had reported the required data, the 
Yugoslav category would have ranked in the top 5 categories of 6 regions (adding 
Slovenia since Slovenia had that result in 1981). We may assume that Kosovo and 
Macedonia (both with large Albanian populations, and both with a history of separatist 
tendencies) would not have included the Yugoslav category in the top 5 even if they 
had reported data at the proper level in 1991. 
What we see is an intensification of the popularity of the Yugoslav category in the 
time span in which ethnic definition was primarily by self-identification (1971-91). We 
cannot really evaluate the mechanisms by which these changes took place with the data Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
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we have. Ideally we would like to have an adequate sample of the raw data at the 
individual level and be able to link those records across censuses, but such an 
undertaking is beyond our resources and perhaps those of the census facilities in the 
former Yugoslavia. 
32 See for example http://www.rastko.rs/rastko-al/zbornik1990/mbarjaktarevic-
predanja_l.php and references therein. 
33 We are obliged to one of our reviewers for stressing this point. 
34 In theory, time trends in the rate of undercount could give the appearance of 
time trends in underlying ethnic distributions, net of any real changes in those 
distributions. An explanation of this phenomenon would require complex arguments 
about the changes in the undercount rate that might create the trends in ethnic 
distribution that we describe here. Our explanation is more parsimonious. 
35 Readers should note again our dependence on the electronic data employed in 
this analysis. These tables give us the detail we need for analysis at the settlement level, 
but they do not give us full detail on the ethnic identities subsequently published at 
higher levels. We have not had access to the full range of ethnicity data at the 
settlement level, and such tables may not exist, either in printed or electronic form. 
36 There is a plethora of measures to describe diversity and segregation. See 
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/housing_patterns/app_b.html. We select 
those used in this analysis because we find the diversity measure intuitively appealing, 
and because the segregation measure is based on it. 
37 In information theory the logarithm to base 2 is used; here we use the natural 
logarithm, which is more commonly employed in studies of diversity and segregation. 
38 As attractive as these measures are, they cannot tell us anything about 
populations that are not explicitly listed in the censuses. A striking example of this is in 
Bosnia, where the three dominant ethnicities are irregularly distributed across the 
landscape. Their distribution is “lumpy”. However, the broad areas in which each is 
dominant are not formal categories in the census. They lie between the level of the 
opština and the republic. Thus the measure, HT, cannot capture the segregation they 
demonstrate without remapping and creation of clusters of opštine that could be inserted 
into our analysis between the level of the formally recognized bounds of the republic 
and its opštine.  
39 Settlement patterns have a hidden and important effect on diversity and 
segregation. The Voyvodina offers an important lesson in interpretation. Even rural 
naselja in Voyvodina are often quite large, being rural towns rather than villages. One 
of the major cities in Voyvodina, Novi Sad, appears as a single naselje in one of the 
censuses. Voyvodina is historically diverse, partly because immigration of non-Slavs 
was encouraged under Austria-Hungary and partly because it was a refuge area for 
Slavic populations fleeing the Ottomans. Yet ethnic neighborhoods exist within these Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
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naselja even if they are invisible in the census, because the naselje is the lowest level of 
census aggregation. Although exploration of the subject is beyond the scope of this 
paper, entropy and segregation both tend to increase with size of settlement. Changes in 
the size of very small settlements are mostly a function of natural increase or decrease 
and of in- and outmigration. Small settlements experience more outmigration than 
inmigration, and this outmigration consists mostly of persons in or below the 
childbearing ages. Small settlements tend to be monoethnic, but large settlements draw 
on an array of settlements of varying monoethnicities. 
40 Although not essential to our arguments in this paper, it is important to note that 
prohibitions on marriage with kin varied by religion and folk custom. Among Orthodox 
Serbs, intermarriage within the patriline, even at its most distant reach, was in theory 
prohibited. The restriction was less strong, perhaps, among Catholics. Among Muslims 
there was a preference for marriage between persons whose fathers were brothers, a 
traditional preference in the Near East, and not only among Muslims. Thus one would 
find that a rapidly expanding patriline in some ethnic groups, especially those of 
Orthodox faith, could within a few generations saturate its territory and exhaust the 
local marriage market, creating pressures for emigration and thus seeding an adjacent 
target area with the same ethnicity. See Hammel (1968) and citations therein. 
41 Some comparative information on fertility by ethnicity in 1991 is available in 
machine-readable form on the 1991 census CD (Yugoslavia 1998). It is a table of 
children ever born, by age of women over 15, by region, by ethnicity, by religion. The 
filename on the CD is POPIS/KNJ13.HTM. It opens as a text file. The most difficult 
part about using it is that you must format the column headers to make it intelligible. 
Since the column headers are uniform across the pages of the table, it is only necessary 
to format the first one and then delete all the others, then save the result to a different 
file in a different directory. 
42 We presume the transfer was to the “unallocated Yugoslav” category, based on 
the definitions of these categories in the census protocols. Similar tables are available in 
print for earlier censuses. 
43 It is interesting to note that the “Yugoslav” category appears in the first four in 
six of the eight regions -- all but Macedonia, where it is sixth, and Kosovo, where it is 
seventh. Both Macedonia and Kosovo have large Albanian populations. 
44 By “no effect” we mean that a location truly containing only five ethnic groups 
would yield the same measures of diversity and segregation whether the computations 
were done based on an 11 category system or on a 5 category system, since the five 
most populous groups would be the same, and the remaining six under an 11-category 
system would contribute zero to the calculations.  
45 The estimate for more than 5 groups is a lower bound, because in Bosnia and 
Croatia in 1991 only 5 groups were reported. Where a location contained more than five Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
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groups, the effect of truncation to five lowers the diversity measure, but the inclusion of 
the omitted population in the category Other, increases it and to some extent offsets the 
reduction in number of categories. 
46 Each box of the boxplot contains observations in the central half of the 
distribution, i.e. the interquartile range, from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile. The dot 
within the box is the median. The dashed lines extend to 1.5 and 3 times the 
interquartile range. The circles denote extreme outliers. (See for example 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Box_plot). 
47 Since the data for Bujanovac and Preševo in 1991 were unreliable, their 
inclusion 1961-81 would have created a biased comparison across time for Central 
Serbia as a whole. Since Kosovo was an integral and separable census unit, it could 
simply be dropped in 1991 without affecting its comparison across 1961-81. Note that 
the published data for these locations or including them at higher levels in 1991 are 
estimates, not counts and are clearly marked as such in the source data. 
48 Voyvodina has been historically diverse because under the Habsburgs it was 
deliberately settled with peasants from other Habsburg lands, notably Hungarians, 
Slovaks and Germans. The Germans were expelled after 1945, and replaced by internal 
migrants from impoverished regions such as Hercegovina. The Serbian presence in 
Voyvodina is largely a consequence of refugee flows from the Ottoman advance. 
49 See Hammel and Stevanović 2004 for an analysis of ethnic migration at the 
opština level in Kosovo. 
50 See http://ucdata.berkeley.edu:7101/project_record.php?recid=28. 
51 For readers unfamiliar with the bootstrap or similar techniques, imagine that our 
data represent the true Yugoslavia but that census takers vary in their competence and 
diligence. We conduct 1,000 censuses of Yugoslavia at the two census dates. Some 
census takers in each census fail to visit an assigned naselje. Some lose their notes. 
Some visit the same place more than once, without realizing it. Some cannot spell. The 
results of these 1,000 imaginary censuses will differ randomly, and we use these 
differences to estimate the random variability in the underlying, actually reported 
census of Yugoslavia on the two census dates in this exercise. 
52 See Klemenčić (1996) for a history of boundary changes and comments that 
would refute an hypothesis of gerrymandering. 
53 An adequate combination of census and geographical data, necessary to 
determine the geographical boundaries of opštine, requires a list of populated places, 
each place with latitude and longitude. As of this writing, such lists have become 
available and include both central points and border polygons for the named locations. 
Difficulties in using such data still remain. First, the geographical (GIS) data are not 
firmly attached to calendrical dates, so that while central points may be reliable, border 
polygons may not be. Second, we do not know how dependent such data are on the Hammel, Mason & Stevanović: Ethnic diversity, segregation, and the collapse of Yugoslavia 
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origin and date of the maps from which data were scanned. Third, we would need to 
reconcile disparities between maps of different date and different origins. Fourth, we 
would need to standardize the spelling of place names. Fifth, we would have to match 
the names of populated places in the geographical databases to the names of naselja in 
the census data. This is not a simple enterprise, since the geographical databases give no 
indication of the borders of administrative units above the level of the populated place 
and below the level of the former republic (now country). Where naselje names are 
duplicated across distinct populated places, we would have to pick the nearest 
populated place named as an opština to decide to which opštine the several naselja 
belonged. We have not yet embarked on this arduous analysis. Nevertheless we claim 
that its outcome, that might allow us to speculate more closely on political intent, is 
secondary to our findings in this paper. 
54 In all fairness we acknowledge that telling ethnic jokes or making disparaging 
remarks about ethnic groups in some other countries (such as the United States) can 
lead to accusations of political incorrectness, apologies, and even resignations. 
55 See Allcock’s discussion of surveys of social distance (2000:198). 
56 See Allcock’s careful dissection of these complex questions (2000:417-431). 
57 See for example Slack and Doyon (2001) on interethnic tension in Bosnia, 
centering on shifting demographic balances, political power, the allocation of jobs, and 
interethnic violence. Their focus was at the opština level, which at least in Bosnia, 
provided a microcosm of the national dilemma. For a detailed description of the 
economic crisis of the 1980s and its political consequences see Allcock (2000:89 ff.), 
and Woodward (1995:47 ff.). 
58 After almost two decades, over 300,000 deaths, and as many as five million 
displaced persons (Leonard 2005:33), the former republics appear to be establishing a 
regional trade network on their own (The Economist, August 22-28, 2009, pp. 45-46).  Demographic Research: Volume 22, Article 35 
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